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 HUBERT DREYFUS ON 
PRACTICAL AND EMBODIED 
INTELLIGENCE 1 
 Kristina Gehrman and John Schwenkler 
 9.1  Introduction 
 If anyone deserves to be called the gadfl y of 20th- century analytic philosophy, it is Hubert 
Dreyfus. Like Socrates, he brought one burning insight to bear in every conversation into 
which he entered. Like Socrates, with zeal he went repeatedly against the mainstream in a way 
that could provoke and exasperate his interlocutors, never more so than when he put his fi nger 
on a fundamental shortcoming of a cherished theory. Like Socrates, he had a well- deserved 
reputation as a dragon slayer: his career was bookended by a devastating critique of artifi cial 
intelligence (AI) projects in the 1970s and a passionate rejection of John McDowell’s conceptu-
alism in the fi rst decade of the 21st century. And it may be that, like Socrates, the profundity of 
Dreyfus’ simple, single- minded philosophy was not fully appreciated during his time. 
 So what was Dreyfus’ fundamental insight? Put simply, it is the thesis that we’ve been 
thinking about  ourselves all wrong. There is, he observed, a “Platonic” conception of human 
nature so deep to Western analytic philosophy as to be all but invisible (Dreyfus  1979 ). 
According to this conception, humans are essentially rational, individual agents. Dreyfus con-
sistently rejected each element of this picture, arguing that rather than being  individual ,  agential , 
and  rational , human beings are  embedded ,  absorbed , and  embodied . Drawing on Heidegger’s con-
ception of lived existence as  Dasein , Dreyfus argued that the Platonic picture of human nature 
is a distortion. As Dreyfus saw it, human beings are embedded in our world like a knot in the 
middle of a fi shing net. 2 Human agency, too, is nothing like the Platonic picture would have it. 
We are rarely— and never ideally— self- directed, explicitly purposive agents. Instead, drawing 
on Merleau- Ponty’s perceptual, body- fi rst conception of action, Dreyfus argued that we are 
responsive, self- forgetful, “absorbed copers” whenever we function normally (competently) 
and expertly. 
 Finally, Dreyfus relied on phenomenology to reject the Platonic picture of human rationality 
itself, beginning by casting doubt on the role of that picture in early AI research. According to 
the Platonic picture, human intelligence is fundamentally calculative, computational, or rule- 
based, involving explicit and codifi able thought, the paradigm of which is inferential reasoning. 
But Dreyfus argued that this picture construes rationality itself in a rationalistic and thus 
distorted way. For Dreyfus, human intelligence can be understood only in light of our  embodied 
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manner of being- in- the- world. When we attend to our characteristic embodiment, we see that 
human intelligence is fi rst and foremost, and most fundamentally,  practical as opposed to theor-
etical. Because of this, the elevation of theoretical rationality that is the bedrock of the Western 
philosophical tradition is a profound mistake. For theory proceeds from, depends upon, and 
ultimately is merely one species of— doing . 
 This brings us to the particular focus, and the primary interpretive claim, of the present 
essay. These three contrasts— individual vs. embedded, agential vs. absorbed, and rational vs. 
embodied— are closely connected in Dreyfus’ thought. And his accounts of each of them, and 
their relationships to one another, evolved over time. But while it is not feasible here to discuss 
each of them in depth, we believe that they can be understood in terms of a single underlying 
conviction. Dreyfus grasped, as very few philosophers do,  the sovereignty of practical intelligence 
over all other forms of intelligence. It is this insight that led him to argue in the 1970s and 80s that 
computers cannot be intelligent because they lack bodies. The same insight led him in the 1990s 
to develop an account of embodied intentionality that does not presuppose aboutness, or rep-
resentational content. And it led him, fi nally, in the early 2000s to develop an account of action 
and practical wisdom that does not depend on deliberation or purposive agency. Ultimately, 
Dreyfus’ preoccupation with the sovereignty of the practical led him to forsake the contested 
terminology of practical reason, action, and intention altogether, and he couched his positive 
views instead in terms of practical skill, practical expertise, phronesis, and skilled, absorbed, or 
embodied coping. 
 The remainder of this essay will focus primarily on Dreyfus’ late- stage contributions to 
practical philosophy and philosophy of action, as represented by his engagement with John 
McDowell and John Searle, and the alternatives that he proposed to their respective theories of 
mind and action. In our view this portion of his life work constitutes the fruition of Dreyfus’ 
sustained but developing commitment to the sovereignty of the practical. His views in this 
domain are radical, but also more plausible and much less easily dismissed than they may ini-
tially appear. 
 9.2  Embodied intentionality vs. the “Standard Story” 
 In his 2005 Presidential Address to the Pacifi c Division of the American Philosophical 
Association, Dreyfus advanced the following theses: 
 •  That in skilled action or skilled “coping,” human beings respond to relevant features of 
their situation in a way that does not involve any mental  representation of these features 
or the goals in virtue of which they are relevant. 
 •  That skilled action therefore does not depend on any psychologically mediated “causal 
chain from input to response” (Dreyfus  2005 : 107). 
 •  That instead, skilled coping consists in a  direct , absorbed, and self- forgetful  responsiveness 
that depends on our embodied capacities and the features of the physical and social 
environments we engage with. 
 These theses were couched in the form of a criticism of John McDowell’s exquisitely nuanced 
form of conceptualism about the mind. The core claim of McDowell’s  Mind and World is that 
“conceptual capacities … are already at work in experiences themselves,” in an avowedly 
“demanding” sense of conceptual capacities as ones that “can be exploited in active thinking, 
thinking that is open to refl ection about its own rational credentials” (McDowell 1994: 47). 
For McDowell, perception and action are permeated with rationality, with understanding, with 
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“logos” as he often calls it— a view that could not be more antithetical to the ideas that Dreyfus 
had spent his career defending. 
 Given the infl uence and stature of  Mind and World , it must have felt to Dreyfus in 2005 
as if he had gained very little ground against the Platonic picture. And in the context of his 
decades- long struggle to resist “the whole conceptual framework which assumes that an explan-
ation of human behavior can and must take the Platonic form” (Dreyfus  1979 : 232), his rather 
scandalous description of McDowell’s grand reconciliation as “a vulture … feed[ing] off  the 
carcass of the Myth of the Given” (Dreyfus  2005 : 53), barely rises to the level of polemic. Yet 
throughout his exchange with McDowell, Dreyfus was not only playing the role of gadfl y, but 
also continuing to develop a positive philosophy of practice and action that he had already given 
substantive expression in his earlier work on action theory, especially when discussing his U.C. 
Berkeley colleague John Searle’s theories of mind and action. For example, in “Heidegger’s 
Critique of the Husserl/ Searle Account of Intentionality,” Dreyfus proposed his own account 
of absorbed coping, which involves “a kind of intentionality that does not involve content at 
all” (Wrathall 2014: 77). 
 Intentionality that does not involve content? Dreyfus was aware of how strange this would 
sound. Philosophers of mind use the word “intentional” to refer to the fact that “mental states 
like perceiving, believing, desiring, fearing, doubting, etc. are always about something, i.e. 
directed at something under some description” (ibid.). Intentionality is thus normally an intrin-
sically contentful, mind- involving notion. But absorbed coping, Dreyfus proposed, manifests “a 
more fundamental sort of intentionality” that is embodied (or bodily)  and yet still intelligent . It is 
a sensitive, engaged, dynamic  orientation of oneself in one’s practical and epistemic milieu (ibid.). 
This kind of embodied intentionality does not admit of a sharp distinction between mind and 
world at all, let alone one that construes the mind primarily or exclusively in terms of  logos , or 
conceptual or rational capacities. Absorbed copers are inextricably embedded in their world. 
And for that reason, Dreyfus’ conception of absorbed coping also does not admit of a distinc-
tion between “mind- to- world” and “world- to- mind” directions of fi t and causation, as in the 
account Searle had worked out in his 1983 book,  Intentionality . 
 At the core of Searle’s theory of intentionality is a parallel between the kinds of representa-
tional states and causal transactions involved in perception and action, respectively. According 
to Searle, a perceptual experience (1) has a  mind- to- world direction of fi t, since it is a state that 
is accurate insofar as it matches how things are anyway in the world, and (2) is the result of a 
process with a  world- to- mind direction of causation, since a person counts as being in a percep-
tual state only if “the way the world is  makes [the person] see it that way” (Searle  1983 : 96). By 
contrast, in intentional action (2 ʹ ) the direction of causation is  mind- to- world , since in acting a 
person makes  the world to be a certain way, and (1 ʹ ) the direction of fi t is  world- to- mind , since 
action is successful insofar as its result “fi ts” the agent’s intention. For Dreyfus, by contrast, 
because the absorbed, expert subject is embedded in the world, she is  pulled into action by her 
world as much as she pushes it into this or that shape. The kind of skillful activity found in 
absorbed coping is not a matter of  making the world outside so that it accords with an internal 
representation of it, any more than perception is just a matter of  taking things in so as to gen-
erate an accurate representation of them. Instead, both are reciprocal. Just as perception is an 
 active process wherein we explore the world to get it to show up for us, so absorbed coping is 
 responsive , attuned; it is a way of being in touch with what one’s surroundings call for and aff ord 
(see also Gehrman  2014 ). 
 We can further clarify Dreyfus’ account of skillful, embodied coping by contrasting it with 
Searle’s representational account of intentional action. Searle’s account centers, fi rst, on the 
following pair of theses: 
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 (A)  That an action is intentional only if the agent is in a  mental state that represents the goal of 
her action; 
 (B)  That this mental state is the  cause of the bodily movement whereby the agent acts as she 
intends to. 
 While the details of Searle’s account are controversial, (A)  and (B)  represent commitments 
that have been widely accepted by analytic philosophers since the infl uential work of Donald 
Davidson. Indeed, David Velleman (1992: 461) has called the picture summed up by (A) and 
(B) the “Standard Story” of action. Searle also defended three further claims which are, in some 
version, widely accepted by analytic action theorists: 
 (C)  That the mental state which represents the goal of an agent’s action is  internal to the 
agent— i.e. it can exist whether or not she acts; 
 (D)  That in acting intentionally, an agent enjoys an  experience that represents her action as the 
cause of her bodily movement; and 
 (E)  That “at any point in a [person’s] conscious life he knows without observation the answer 
to the question, ‘What are you now doing?’ ” (Searle  1983 : 90)— at least where this concerns 
the descriptions under which the person’s action is intentional. 3 
 Dreyfus challenged each one of these claims, arguing that  none of them are supported by the 
phenomenology of purposive activity, and that to the extent that they have a basis in the logic 
of our ordinary action- descriptions or the psychology of “common sense” this is only because 
our ordinary self- understanding is distorted by the Platonic picture. 
 Consider fi rst thesis (D). According to Searle ( 1983 :  87– 8) there are “characteristic 
experiences” of an intentional action such as raising your arm, and the intentional content of 
these experiences has a self- referential character: an experience of acting  represents itself as the 
cause of the bodily movement whereby the agent does what she intends. Against this, Dreyfus 
argues that if we “return to the phenomena” with open minds, we fi nd that “in a wide variety 
of situations human beings relate to the world in an organized purposive manner without the 
constant accompaniment of a representational state which specifi es what the action is aimed at 
accomplishing” (Wrathall 2014: 83). He gives a range of examples:
 skillful activity like playing tennis; habitual activity like driving to the offi  ce or brushing 
one’s teeth; casual unthinking activity like rolling over in bed or making gestures while 
one is speaking; and spontaneous activity such as fi dgeting and drumming one’s fi n-
gers during a dull lecture. 
 Ibid. 
 All of these activities involve movement that is organized, purposive, and sensitive to envir-
onmental contingencies. Yet there is  no phenomenological support for the claim that there are 
“characteristic experiences” of acting in any of these ways— let alone experiences that represent 
themselves as the cause of one’s movements. As Dreyfus observed, when these forms of action 
involve any experience at all, it is not an experience of oneself as  causing one’s activity, but rather 
of a direct responsiveness to the environment whereby “[o] ne’s activity is completely geared 
into the demands of the situation” (ibid.: 81). Indeed, there is more evidence in the phenomen-
ology of expert action for saying that the world  causes me to act by eliciting an expert response, 
than for attributing causality  to me via my experience of what I do. 
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 Dreyfus’ argument against thesis (E) proceeds in a similar way. One often  fi nds that one has 
been gesturing wildly or making the correct turns on a well- learned route, without having 
known that one was doing these things. 4 And yet there is usually a goal intrinsic to these kinds 
of activities, which the person who engages in them would treat as her own. One might say, 
for example, that one was gesturing wildly for emphasis, or that one turned right to avoid 
the traffi  c on Sunset, without thereby committing to the self- awareness that (E)  stipulates 
must attend intentional actions. And Dreyfus argued that the same holds for more complex 
capacities: for example, he loved to cite Larry Bird, who claimed that “[a] lot of times, I’ve 
passed the basketball and not realized I’ve passed it until a moment or so later” (quoted in 
Dreyfus 1993:  84). This phenomenon supports a construal of an expert’s self- knowledge 
quite at odds with the one that Searle assumes. For Dreyfus, even  without non- observational 
knowledge of her own activity, the expert does what she does in precisely the way that her 
situation demands. 
 Dreyfus did not claim that purposive activity  never involves experience of one’s movements 
or non- observational knowledge of what one does. On the contrary, he argued that conscious 
self- monitoring is necessary in certain situations, including when acquiring a new skill or exer-
cising a well- learned skill in diffi  cult or unfamiliar circumstances. It is primarily in situations like 
these, he says, that one acts with “a sense of eff ort with the condition of satisfaction that [this] 
eff ort causes the appropriate goal- directed movements”— a way of self- consciously representing 
our actions that “certainly [has] a place in the overall explanation of how it is that we manage 
to act in a wide range of situations” (Dreyfus 1993: 89). The mistake of (E) is to conclude that 
the capacities for self- monitoring that we draw on in these  special situations are also part of the 
explanation of purposive activity in the more ordinary situation when there is no particular 
pressure to attend to the structure of one’s action. 5 
 Consider fi nally Searle’s thesis (C), which holds that what makes an action intentional must 
be a representation that can exist independently of her bodily movements and their eff ects, 
which in turn can exist without the representation. For Searle ( 1983 : 89– 90), this independ-
ence of intention from movement is shown by a pair of cases: a person whose arm has been 
anaesthetized and then held down may, if his eyes are closed, have a mistaken experience as of 
moving his arm; and a person whose arm is made to move directly by stimulation of his motor 
cortex will be such that his arm moves without the experience characteristic of  his moving his 
arm intentionally. 
 Against this analysis, Dreyfus would argue that these cases do not present us with the  usual 
phenomenon of moving purposively in a world we are “geared into” by our interests. Except in 
moments where we are forced to adopt an explicitly self- aware, refl exive perspective on what 
we are doing, in purposive activity we are so thoroughly embedded in the world that what 
happens “in us” is not a separate domain from what takes place in our “surroundings.” The 
binary subject- object or agent- world distinction that is implied by (C), and which the analytic 
tradition takes for granted, severely distorts the phenomenology of  everyday activity, even if we 
can think of cases where the agent- world contrast has application. 
 9.3  A Sisyphean task? 
 Dreyfus ( 2005 ) avails himself of resources from “the phenomenology of everyday expertise” to 
criticize theses (C)– (E) and propose substantive alternative accounts of the relevant phenomena. 
But are those resources suffi  cient to ground a substantive alternative to the “Standard Story” 
of (A) and (B)? When he sought to slay the dragon of the computational theory of mind in 
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 What Computers Can’t Do , Dreyfus acknowledged that doing so would (at least at fi rst) be a 
Sisyphean task:
 [T] he impetus gained by the mutual reinforcement of two thousand years of tradition 
and its product, the most powerful device ever invented by man [namely, the digital 
computer], is simply too great to be arrested [or] defl ected. … The most that can be 
hoped is that we become aware that the direction this impetus has taken … is not the 
only possible direction; … that there may be a way of understanding human reason 
that explains both why the computer paradigm is irresistible and why it must fail. 
 1979: 232 
 In the AI context, Dreyfus hoped, not to replace or refute the “computer paradigm,” but rather 
to counteract its distorting eff ects by giving an  at least equally plausible phenomenological 
description of human reason. When it comes to his account of skilled, absorbed coping and 
practical expertise, we propose that Dreyfus is best understood to have the same aims and pri-
orities. That is, while he argued forcefully against the mentalistic models of action and practical 
intelligence that he sought to disrupt, Dreyfus was in the end most interested in presenting an 
 at least equally plausible phenomenological account of the relevant phenomena, to show that the 
Standard Story is “not the only possible direction” that an account of human action can take. 
With this in mind we will devote the present section to motivating Dreyfus’ supposedly radical 
claims about practical intelligence, in order to vindicate them as an intelligible alternative to 
the Standard Story. 
 Many of Dreyfus’ best- known examples of absorbed, expert coping are things that are already 
readily understood as primarily embodied: playing soccer, riding a bike, wielding a hammer, and 
other examples of what Aristotle might have thought of as technical expertise (see Heidegger 
 1996 : 64ff .; Aristotle  2001 : 179). But the familiarity of absorbed practical phenomenology in 
such cases is the thin edge of a wedge that can, if we allow it, separate us gradually from the 
Platonic conception of ourselves as rational, agential individuals. 
 To this end, we can begin by observing fi rst that the same absorbed quality that characterizes 
one’s competent use of a hammer or pen also characterizes many activities which, on the 
Platonic picture, constitutively involve the intellect. While Dreyfus’ favorite example was the 
skillful play of the chess grandmaster, here we will use for illustration some of the activities that 
are typically part of being a professional academic philosopher: teaching a class, constructing 
a logical proof, writing a paper, or posing a question following a colleague’s oral presentation. 
These are the kinds of activities with respect to which virtually all academic philosophers are 
expert. If Dreyfus is right that skilled coping is both  normally and  ideally absorbed, then even 
these paradigmatically intellect- involving activities ought to exhibit the absorbed phenomen-
ology of embodied, engaged intentionality. That is, if Dreyfus is right, then in some real way even 
these paradigmatically intellectual activities  don’t involve the mind when they are expertly done. 
 So, consider what you are doing when you are giving a lecture on a familiar topic. (Non- 
academics can substitute an appropriately intellectual activity at which they have the relevant 
degree of expertise.) You are, for example, speaking certain words at a certain pace and with 
a certain pattern of emphasis. You are making eye contact with others in the room. You are 
using language in a way that aims to communicate clearly and (perhaps) eloquently. You are 
monitoring the reactions and interactions of the class, and inserting yourself into the developing 
social events as they take place, in a way that furthers the background objectives that structure 
and explain your actions in the fi rst place. 
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 Now, in doing all of this,  where is your attention? Where is your focus? Your focus is on what 
you are doing. But your focus is not on what you are doing in the way that a peer observer 
tasked with writing a teaching evaluation would focus on you teaching the class. You are not 
attending to yourself as agent; you are attending as agent to what you do. Your focus is  in what 
you are doing; your attention is taken up by the activity, and other possible candidates for your 
attention recede. 
 This focused, active, attuned, attentive, absorbed kind of activity  just is (Dreyfus might say) 
what it is to act purposively with skill. To act in this way is to realize absorbed intentionality. 
In order to be skillfully or expertly teaching purposively,  you have to actually be teaching — not 
thinking about teaching, not attending to yourself teaching as an observer might, not describing 
what it is to teach, not intending to teach, not planning how to teach another person to teach 
in the way that you currently are. In teaching skillfully you are simply:  teaching . If you are doing 
what you do “at someone else’s prompting” (Aristotle  2001 : 114), under the guidance of a set 
of rules, or while narrating what you do either to yourself or aloud, you are divided in your 
purpose, divided in your attention, not “all in” on the action that was ostensibly what you were 
up to. In the very dividedness of your attention, you would do what you did in a less expert 
(because less absorbed) way. 
 9.4  Practical wisdom without rationality 
 For Dreyfus, absorbed coping is possible only when a skill is fully integrated into the subject’s 
way of being- in- the- world. By contrast, less- than- absorbed, less- than- embodied, less- than- 
embedded action is not yet truly chosen in this way; it is not yet fully, autonomously purposive 
or intentional because it has not yet become  part of you . 
 This thought may help us to see how Dreyfus could respond to the philosophical orthodoxy 
that the concept of  acting for a reason deserves a central place in any philosophical account of 
what it is to act intentionally. This assumption accounts for the dominance of the Standard Story 
of intentional action as bodily movement that is caused by an intention: for how can one  act 
for a reason without having this reason somewhere “in mind”? And what would it be to act for 
 this reason— as opposed to another one that is also in mind— except for this reason to make an 
appropriate (presumably, causal) diff erence to what one does? 6 
 Dreyfus’ account seems at fi rst especially unable to account for these aspects of everyday 
action- explanation. If a person’s mental states are not involved in causing her intentional actions, 
then there does not seem to be anything there to ground an intention- revealing answer to the 
question “Why did you do that?” Compounding the problem, Dreyfus frequently presents his 
views in a way that suggests that he is denying a role to the agent in choosing, causing, or gen-
erating her own actions. 7 For example in “A Merleau- Pontian Critique of Husserl’s and Searle’s 
Representationalist Accounts of Action,” he says:
 Merleau- Ponty argues that what we might call absorbed coping does not require that 
the agent’s movements be governed by an intention in action that represents … what 
the agent is trying to achieve. Rather, in absorbed coping the agent’s body is led to 
move so as to reduce a sense of deviation from a satisfactory gestalt without the agent 
knowing what that satisfactory gestalt will be like in advance of achieving it. Thus, in 
absorbed coping, rather than a sense of trying to achieve success, one has a sense of 
being drawn towards an equilibrium. 
 2000: 293 
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 In passages like this one, experts start to seem like zombies, or like iron fi lings in the presence 
of so many magnets. And if so then the Anscombean question “Why did you do that?” might 
seem, as she put it, to be appropriately “ refused application ” (Anscombe  1963 : 11) in any case of 
absorbed coping— in which case it is not at all clear that  anything distinguishes the intentional 
from the non- or un- intentional on Dreyfus’ account. 
 Let us attempt to address this concern on Dreyfus’ behalf. The  phenomena , he will insist, 
as opposed to any grammatical test, are the criteria that must distinguish intentional expert 
coping from other ways of being- in- the- world. And in many cases this is plausible. It is easy, for 
example, to think of ways in which the actions of an expert diff er characteristically from the 
actions of a novice or an incompetent bungler. For Dreyfus, the real challenge is the automaton. 
How can we distinguish,  on phenomenological grounds alone , between the absorbed, expert coper, 
and the absent- minded person who is operating on autopilot? 
 Let us consider the question in the context of a specifi c example. Suppose that on Monday 
you drive your manual transmission sedan to work along your usual route. You are relaxed and 
well- slept, and your cell phone is tucked away in your bag. You keep your eyes on the road, you 
don’t grind the gears, and you push it with the yellow lights just as much as you feel is wise, 
no more, no less. Now it is Tuesday. Overtired and engaged in a voice- texting argument with 
your spouse, you grind the gears several times getting into second, need to slam on the brakes at 
least once to avoid running a red, and pull in to your spot with the gas light on only to realize 
that on Tuesdays you have a standing appointment across town and you ought not to have been 
driving to work in the fi rst place. 
 As with Dreyfus’ favorite comparison between the deft and sure activity of the expert and 
the hesitant and fumbling behavior of the novice, there are many familiar diff erences in the phe-
nomenology of these two scenarios, from both the fi rst- and the third- person perspectives. On 
Monday, you are coping in an absorbed, expert fashion under a number of descriptions: shifting 
gears, driving to work, being a defensive driver, etc. Similar to our earlier discussion of the 
expert philosopher, as you do these things your focus, your attention is on what you are doing 
under these descriptions. On this particular morning, the focus of your absorbed attention is 
on navigating the roads, shifting your gears, getting to work in a timely manner. There will be 
phenomena characteristic of being engaged in doing these things, and ways that another person 
who is engaged in observing you closely might be able to tell that you are doing them in an 
absorbed, expert way. Your passenger might notice, for example, that there is never a lurch in 
momentum when you shift from second to third gear. They may hear a small chuckle or see 
you lean forward slightly when you hit a yellow light at just the right moment to justify a small 
burst of speed. They may pick up on the fact that you are relaxed. 
 On Tuesday, what are you doing? You are certainly absorbed in  something . But what? Not 
the same things you were absorbed in the morning before. Instead, your focus is on something 
else: the voice- texting argument, resentment about your lack of sleep, and the glowing gas light 
on the dashboard. These things command your attention and assume the place of proximal 
nodes in your net, embedding you in the world a quite diff erent way as compared to the way 
you were embedded on Monday, when the gear shifter, the road, the overall drive were your 
proximal nodes. On Tuesday, distracted and distanced from the driving- related activities, you 
grind the gears. You fail to time the lights well. You do not drive where you set out to go. And 
the phenomenology of these activities will be very diff erent from the phenomenology of what 
were in some sense the same activities during Monday’s drive, both from a fi rst- person per-
spective (the stress, the sweaty palms, the constant guilty peeking to proofread the latest voice- 
texted zinger before hitting send) and from a third- person perspective (the palpable tension, 
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the vehicular lurches, the conspicuous absence of chuckles, the eyes on the dash and the phone 
more than the road, etc.). 
 On the phenomenological account that we have just sketched, it is not as if absorbed, 
attentive defensive driving is reason- involving in a way that driving distractedly is not. For each 
of these activities is in its own way embodied and embedded in the world, and thus absorbed in 
its own set of practical problems. And this similarity is what gave rise to the concern that there 
is no room within Dreyfus’ account for answering Anscombe’s “special sense of the question 
‘Why?’.” But the subject in this example is absorbed in very diff erent things on Monday and 
Tuesday, and the phenomenology of their activities manifests this diff erence. We can say: the 
drive on Monday is an example of expert Dreyfusian intentional action; it is expert absorbed 
coping. The drive on Tuesday is  not an example of expert Dreyfusian intentional action, though 
the voice- texting argument might be. We suspect that anybody who thinks that the phenom-
enology of these two cases will be fi rst- or third- personally indistinguishable has no direct 
experience of the relevant sort. 
 We also acknowledge that some reservations about Dreyfus’ views will persist to whatever 
extent his interlocutors remain in the grip of the Platonic picture of humankind (and we 
include ourselves in this). For if our conception of intentionality is that it is essentially con-
ceptual, representational, and self- aware, then naturally any view to the contrary will seem 
to lose the phenomenon of intentionality itself. And the same goes for agency, for agents 
and their purposive activity. But if Dreyfus had meant simply to reject or refute the Platonic 
picture of human mentality, he would have had no need to recruit the vocabulary and con-
ceptual frames of phenomenology to do so. He could have simply adopted the stance of 
skeptic, so to speak from  inside the Platonic tradition, arguing that rationality, individuality, 
and agency are not characteristics of human beings. Instead, Dreyfus sought to save the prac-
tical phenomena, and to focus attention on a very diff erent way of understanding ourselves: as 
embedded, absorbed, and embodied beings. And this implies that he believed the phenomena 
of purposive human practical life are there to be saved. The embedded subject still interacts 
with her world; she is not merely acted upon. The absorbed coper still strives purposively, and 
can succeed (or fail) to achieve what she aims to achieve. The embodied coper still attends 
to her world and comports herself in a way that is informed by intelligent appreciation of 
that world. For Dreyfus, practical intelligence is not an illusion. It is, as we put it earlier,  sov-
ereign over all other forms of intelligence, and that is why the former cannot be satisfyingly 
explained in terms of the latter. It remains for us to work with the materials he off ered to see 
whether we can make sense of absorbed intentionality in terms that he would have found 
acceptable. 
 Notes 
 1  This chapter is dedicated, with deep gratitude, to the memory of Hubert L. Dreyfus. We are grateful to 
an audience at the 2017 Southeastern Epistemology Conference, held at Florida State University, for 
helpful feedback on an earlier draft. 
 2  See also Dreyfus ( 1991 ), (2000), and (2014; especially Chapters  1 and 9). Dreyfus’ interpretation of 
Heidegger is controversial and often idiosyncratic; for more on this see Braver (2011: 145ff .), Wrathall 
(2014), and Wrathall and Malpas ( 2000a ,  2000b ). On the self as a node in a net, compare Arne Naess 
( 1973 ), who was also infl uenced by Heidegger. 
 3  Notably, in her seminal work  Intention G. E. M. Anscombe fl atly rejects each of (A) through (D). The 
language of  knowledge without observation , in contrast, is due to her (1963[1957]: 13). 
 4  However, for some critical discussion of this sort of argument see Schwenkler ( 2019 : 22 – 4, 44 – 5). 
 5  As Sean Kelly puts it,
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 just as the child assumes that the refrigerator light must always be on, since it is on every time 
he looks, so too our proposed analyst has claimed that since the intention to type an  f is explicit 
when the subject is paying attention to his activity, so too it must have been among the conditions 
that characterized the content of the activity even when he was not paying attention to it. This is 
a bad principle in the case of absorbed activity, just as in the case of refrigerator lights. 
 2005: 20 
 6  As Davidson famously put it, unless we treat reason- giving explanations as causal “we are without an 
analysis of the ‘because’ in ‘He did it because …’, where we go on to name a reason” (1980: 11). 
 7  See Braver (2011), No e ̈ (2013), and Gehrman ( 2016 ). 
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